Redefining Frontiers of EU Discrimination Law by Atrey, Shreya
                          Atrey, S. (2017). Redefining Frontiers of EU Discrimination Law. Public
Law, 2017, 185-195.
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available via
Sweet & Maxwell. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
  1 
Redefining Frontiers of EU Discrimination Law 
[forthcoming in Public Law (April 2017)] 
 
Shreya Atrey* 
 
Within the rapidly evolving field of discrimination law, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v 
Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia 1  marks a highpoint of development in EU law—a 
claimant who does not herself possess a relevant personal characteristic can claim either 
direct or indirect discrimination on the basis of the said personal characteristic. This result lies 
in stark contrast with the paradigmatic case of discrimination claimed by someone who is 
disadvantaged because of her own personal characteristic, whether directly because of 
difference in treatment or indirectly due to a neutral practice which disproportionately impacts 
her and those with whom she shares the personal characteristic. In reimagining an ideal 
claimant and the boundaries between direct and indirect discrimination, the ECJ revises the 
precincts of discrimination law in a profound way.  
 
The result followed from these facts: Ms Nikolova ran a grocery shop in Gizdova mahala 
district of Dupnitsa town in Bulgaria. CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD supplied electricity 
to the town. It installed meters at a height of 1.7 meters everywhere except in Gizdova malaha 
where they were installed at an overhead height of about 6-7 meters, ostensibly to curtail the 
high incidence of tampering and electricity theft. Ms Nikolova complained of discrimination 
on the basis of racial or ethnic origin because Gizdova malaha was a predominantly Roma 
district. Two hurdles lay in the way of her claim: first, when everyone in a predominantly 
                                                 
*  Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute (Florence). DPhil (Oxon), BCL (Dist) (Oxon), BA 
LLB (Hons) (NALSAR). 
 I am grateful to Sandra Fredman, Grainne de Burca, Miles Jackson and Gautam Bhatia for their helpful 
discussions on the case and painstaking reading of the case note. 
1  C-83/14 [2015] All ER (EC) 1083 (ECJ).  
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Roma district is affected by the impugned practice, should the claim be classified as direct or 
indirect discrimination on the ground of racial or ethnic origin? Secondly, could Ms Nikolova 
claim discrimination on that ground, given that she herself was not Roma? Upon reference 
from the Administrative Court of Sofia, the ECJ delivered its judgment in CHEZ RB agreeing 
on both counts – first, that the practice could be classified as either direct or indirect 
discrimination and second, that Ms Nikolova could claim discrimination despite being non-
Roma under the terms of Race Directive 2000/43, which prohibited discrimination on the 
basis of racial or ethnic origin. 
 
Ground-breaking as the result is, the reasoning in CHEZ RB is defensible only in part. While 
the ECJ rightly allowed the claim of direct discrimination, the same result should not have 
followed for indirect discrimination. This note explains why.  
 
Direct Discrimination 
 
CHEZ RB exemplifies the rare case where a court appreciates, what Finnis calls, ‘the basic 
structure of practical reasoning, intending, deciding, and acting,’ often missed in finding for 
direct discrimination.2 The key to the ECJ’s line of reasoning on direct discrimination lies in 
its clarity over what constituted the following elements in the discrimination inquiry: 
intention, distinction, ground, impact, and justification, which were delineated as: 
Intention Distinction Ground/Reason Impact Justification 
Prevent Roma 
from stealing 
electricity  
District Ethnic Origin On everyone in the district 
(Roma and Non-
Roma) of being unable 
to inspect meters and 
stereotyped as an 
offender 
Prevention of 
Electricity 
Theft 
 
                                                 
2  JM Finnis, Intention and Identity (OUP 2011) 269-276.  
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First and foremost, intention as in motive played no role in the Court’s reasoning. Even if the 
electricity company wanted to particularly discriminate against Roma or to prevent them from 
stealing electricity by tampering with meters, such an intention was neither necessary nor 
dispositive in proving direct discrimination. In fact, the ECJ has never really been concerned 
with intentionality,3  unlike for example, the US courts which continue to identify direct 
discrimination on this basis.4 This avoids the problem of unduly burdening the claimants with 
proving the discriminator’s animus or malicious intent, and the counterintuitive result of 
upholding actions which although based on a personal characteristic were not meant to be 
discriminatory.5 
 
Secondly, the Court readily connected the impugned distinction (district) to the ground or 
reason for such distinction (ethnic origin). This is notable because CHEZ RB is unlike a 
typical case of direct discrimination where the impugned distinction was itself explicitly 
based on a ground, say, in a situation where the electric company explicitly stated that 
overhead meters were to be installed only in Roma households. In order to establish direct 
discrimination in this case, the ECJ had to extract the reason for the impugned distinction on 
the basis of which some people received less favourable treatment (those in Gizdova mahala) 
than others (everyone else in Dupnitsa town). This however was straightforward in that it was 
undisputed that the practice was ‘introduced and/or maintained for reasons relating to the 
ethnic origin common to most of the inhabitants of the district concerned.’6 The ECJ followed 
the mandate in Article 2(2)(a) of the Race Directive to find direct discrimination ‘on grounds 
of racial or ethnic origin’ such that the grounds (race or ethnic origin) coincided with the 
                                                 
3  Coleman v Attridge Law C-303/06 [2008] All ER (EC) 1105 (ECJ) (see esp Advocate General 
Maduro’s opinion [19]). 
4  Washington v Davis (1976) 426 US 229, 240; Price Waterhouse v Hopkins (1989) 490 US 228; Desert 
Palace v Costa (2003) 539 US 90, 2153-55; Ash v Tyson Foods, Inc (2006) 546 US 454, 456. 
5  Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 203-214.  
6  CHEZ RB (n 1) [91]. 
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reason for less favourable treatment. With this, a case of unstated direct discrimination, i.e. 
where the basis for distinction was not explicitly based on grounds, become a case of direct 
discrimination proper.  
 
Thirdly, the Court also did not confound the justification for the impugned practice – 
prevention of electricity theft – with the reason for discrimination itself, thereby occluding the 
possibility of finding for direct discrimination. The court differentiated the reason from the 
justification by agreeing that though the electricity company acted in pursuance of the goal of 
preventing electricity theft – which was legitimate per se – it had decided to pursue this goal 
by targeting Bulgarian nationals of Roma origin on the basis of ‘ethnic stereotypes or 
prejudices, the racial grounds thus combining with other grounds [like prevention of 
electricity theft].’7 The presence of racial or ethnic origin-based reasoning (even if along with 
other justificatory grounds) was enough for the Court to identify direct discrimination. And 
since the justification of preventing electricity theft fit neither of the two permissible 
justifications for direct discrimination – genuine occupational requirement or positive action 
under Articles 4 and 5 of the Race Directive – the finding of direct discrimination was 
confirmed. 
 
Fourthly, the ECJ recognised that though Ms Nikolova was not Roma, because she owned a 
shop in the Gizdova mahala district, she suffered the same disadvantage as people of Roma 
origin in that district – of being unable to inspect her electricity meter and being stereotyped 
as a potential perpetrator – disadvantage that was based on racial or ethnic origin since the 
district was singled out on that basis. This disadvantage was niftily read into direct 
discrimination under Article 2(2)(a) of the Race Directive — by basing direct discrimination 
                                                 
7  ibid [82]. 
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not only on the discriminator’s reasoning but also on the impact it had on the claimant and 
those in her position. According to the ECJ, it was important to take into account:  
 
the compulsory, widespread, and lasting nature of the practice at issue which, because, 
first, it has thus been extended without distinction to all the district’s inhabitants 
irrespective of whether their individual meters have been t[a]mpered with… and of the 
identity of the perpetrators of that conduct and, secondly,…the inhabitants of that 
district…as whole [are] considered to be potential perpetrators of such unlawful 
conduct.8  
 
This reasoning does two things. In the first instance, it enmeshes the perpetrator-oriented view 
(based on his/her reasoning) with the victim-oriented view (based on impact) of direct 
discrimination. 9  In the second instance, it enlarges the protectorate which may claim 
discrimination, like Ms Nikolova, even though they do not themselves possess the personal 
characteristic which is the basis of discrimination, but share the disadvantage with those who 
suffer on the basis of that personal characteristic. The ECJ had sufficient basis in EU law to 
do this.  
 
According to the Court, the concept of ‘“discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin”, for 
the purpose of Directive 2000/43 and, in particular, of Articles 1 and 2(1) thereof’ was not 
personal in nature in that it concerned not just those with a particular personal characteristic 
but all those who together with the former suffered less favourable treatment or particular 
disadvantage.10 As the ECJ noted, the right to be protected from discrimination derived from 
the general and broader right to equality and equal treatment which extends protection to ‘all’, 
not just those who suffer disadvantage based on their own personal characterises.11 Had EU 
                                                 
8  ibid [84]. 
9  Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (OUP 2015) 160-163.  
10  CHEZ RB (n 1) [60]. 
11  Race Equality Council Directive 2000/43/EC, Preamble, Recitals 3, 16, and Articles 1, 3; Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000/C 364/01, Article 21; Treaty establishing the 
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law meant to protect only disadvantaged groups from protection, it would possibly have 
enumerated those groups, such that equality and non-discrimination applied directly and only 
to Roma, Muslims, Blacks, women etc and not to everyone. Instead, the Race Directive 
2000/43 proscribes discrimination ‘based on racial or ethnic origin.’ What this means is that 
anyone who is discriminated against on the basis of race or ethnic origin can claim 
discrimination under the Directive. The fact that direct discrimination under Article 2(2)(a) is 
not defined in terms of discrimination on the ground of ‘their/his/her’ race or ethnic origin 
supports this interpretation.  
 
Following similar logic, the ECJ had previously extended the scope of direct discrimination to 
an employee who was harassed and dismissed not because of any of her own personal 
characteristics but because of her son’s disability.12 CHEZ RB takes this reasoning a step 
further in that it does not just extend protection from direct discrimination to people 
personally associated with those possessing the relevant personal characteristic (Coleman) but 
someone suffering mere collateral disadvantage like Ms Nikolova. It also goes further than 
cases of perceived or mistaken forms of discrimination like, say, the case of a light-skin 
mixed race woman who considers herself Black or a Sikh man who is dismissed by his 
employer mistaking him for a Muslim man, both of which would also qualify as direct 
discrimination on the basis of race and religion against those considered as de facto members 
of disadvantaged groups. But Ms Nikolova neither identified herself as Roma nor was 
mistaken to be such13— instead, Ms Nikolova’s case was simply that she suffered the same 
disadvantage as persons of Roma origin because she shared the basis of distinction 
(membership in the Roma district) which was in turn based on racial or ethnic origin 
                                                                                                                                                        
European Community 2006/C 321 E/37, Article 13; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
2012/C 326/01, Article 19.  
12  Coleman (n 3).  
13  CHEZ RB (n 1) [48]. 
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(assuming Roma to be potential perpetrators). In allowing her claim, the ECJ extends the 
personal scope of direct discrimination to cases of collateral discrimination in addition to 
associative or perceived forms of discrimination.  
 
Indirect Discrimination 
 
The ECJ did not conclude its findings with direct discrimination. It went on to hold that the 
impugned practice could, in the alternative, be classified as indirect discrimination. In contrast 
with the lengthy discussion on direct discrimination, its terse reasoning on indirect 
discrimination was that: the basis of distinction or criterion (district) could in principle be 
considered apparently neutral and since it disproportionately affected Roma on the basis of 
their ethnic origin, it constituted indirect discrimination under Article 2(2)(b). Whilst it 
reflects the good result of bringing about substantive equality for all persons in Gizdova 
mahala district, this result would have followed from the holding on direct discrimination just 
the same. Thus, the finding in regards indirect discrimination though incontrovertible in what 
it achieved, seems superfluous. But besides the fact that the ECJ did not really need to 
confirm the claim of indirect discrimination in order to address the disadvantage complained 
of by Ms Nikolova, this note seeks to show that her claim was in fact a poor fit for indirect 
discrimination and perhaps should not have been addressed as such at all, even in the 
alternative.  
 
There are two key problems with the ECJ’s reasoning on indirect discrimination: first, it is 
misguided in its interpretation of what constitutes neutrality in Article 2(2)(b); and secondly, 
it misapplies the comparator requirement for indirect discrimination. Together the two make 
plain that the claim was simply one of direct rather than indirect discrimination under Article 
  8 
2(2)(b). On the other hand, the ECJ’s readiness to extend the personal scope of indirect 
discrimination – to someone like Ms Nikolova who did not herself possess the relevant racial 
or ethnic origin which formed the basis of the claim – seems appropriate in light of the 
established jurisprudence as well as the framing of Article 2(2)(b). However, a third potential 
problem, though of a much lesser extent, could be in extending CHEZ RB wholesale to those 
who do not share the disadvantage suffered on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, especially 
in cases of intersectional discrimination when racial or ethnic origin is not the only basis of an 
indirect claim. Thus, one may welcome the broad scope of claiming indirect discrimination 
with an appreciation of its limitations, especially in potential cases of intersectional 
discrimination.  
 
In the first instance, the ECJ was drawn into this quagmire because of the fuzzy definition in 
Article 2(2)(b), which defines indirect discrimination as ‘taken to occur where an apparently 
neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a 
particular disadvantage compared with other persons.’ As Thomsen explains, the problem 
with this definition is that it would: 
  
counterintuitively [not] label an actually (rather than apparently) neutral practice that 
disadvantaged persons on the grounds of group membership as indirect discrimination, 
and that it would label a practice that is in fact classical direct discrimination as 
indirect discrimination, so long as sufficient deception is provided to make it appear 
neutral.14 
 
This is in fact what transpired. The ECJ, instead of interpreting ‘apparently neutral’ as 
‘obviously’ or ‘actually’ neutral, confirmed Thomsen’s doubt that neutrality in Article 2(2)(b) 
meant neutral only ‘ostensibly’ or ‘at first glance’.15 The deception in this case was the use 
of the apparently neutral distinction of district rather than a classification explicitly referring 
                                                 
14  Frej Klem Thomsen, ‘Stealing Bread and Sleeping Beneath Bridges – Indirect Discrimination as 
Disadvantageous Equal Treatment’ (2015) 2 Moral Philosophy and Politics 299, 300.  
15  CHEZ RB (n 1) [93].  
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to racial or ethnic origin. But once having pierced through it as based on the ground of racial 
or ethnic origin and hence constituting direct discrimination, the ECJ’s turn towards 
considering the deception as neutral again for the purposes of indirect discrimination seems 
unnecessary but perhaps required by the strange framing of Article 2(2)(b).16 It does not 
sound right in the same way as Thomsen’s apt example of direct discrimination which ends 
up being classified as indirect discrimination under this definition: 
 
[In the] Tamil scandal that brought down a Conservative Danish government in 1993, 
that the Minister in charge of granting refugee status publicly claims that the 
procedure for doing so treats all applicants equally and fairly, while in reality, and by 
the express order of the Minister claiming the opposite, the Ministry discriminates 
against Tamil asylum seekers. Calling this a case of indirect discrimination, as the 
definition would seem to require that we do, does not sound right. 
 
This interpretation of the phrase ‘apparently neutral’ also sits uncomfortably with the rest of 
the ruling in CHEZ RB where the ECJ finds that Article 2(2)(b) precludes a national provision 
on indirect discrimination which requires an impugned measure ‘to have been adopted for 
reasons of racial or ethnic origin.’17 The classification of impugned measures when they are 
apparently to do with racial or ethnic origin as cases of indirect discrimination seems absurd 
since indirect discrimination ultimately does not require any proof of reasons based on racial 
or ethnic origin. So while CHEZ RB’s understanding of ‘apparently neutral’ makes claims 
like Ms Nikolova’s to be classified as both direct and indirect discrimination, it can make 
other cases of indirect discrimination stand out awkwardly when they are not just apparently 
but actually based on a neutral measure.  
 
Assuming the neutrality condition to be rightly interpreted and satisfied, the condition of 
particular disadvantage as compared to other groups under Article 2(2)(b) is misapplied 
                                                 
16  Thomsen (n 15) 300.  
17  CHEZ RB (n 1) [97]. 
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because of the lack of a relevant comparator group in this case. What the ECJ missed is that 
the Roma in Gizdova mahala were not put at a ‘particular disadvantage compared with other 
persons,’ i.e. non-Roma in the district, because both Roma and non-Roma like Ms Nikolova 
suffered alike from the impugned practice. Indirect discrimination ceases to arise when the 
neutral practice does not divide the class to which it applies between those who were 
disadvantaged (based on a personal characteristic) versus others (who do not share that 
personal characteristic). The absolute coincidence of disadvantage – of being unable to 
inspect their electricity meters and being stereotyped as potential perpetrators – suffered by 
everyone in Gizdova mahala irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin undercuts the idea of 
comparative or relative disadvantage in Article 2(2)(b).   
 
Even if the ECJ had in mind to compare the disadvantage of persons in Gizdova mahala with 
other districts in Dupnitsa town, unfortunately such a comparison would also not have worked 
considering the practice was not applied to other districts at all. Other districts in Dupnitsa 
would have been ideal comparators had Gizdovala mahala not been singled out as the district 
to which the practice applied. In fact, the ECJ was clear that the broader and neutral purpose 
of preventing electricity theft and meter tempering throughout Dupnitsa was not the basis of 
the practice itself but its justification under Article 2(2)(b)— one which was found to be 
neither appropriate nor necessary in the absence of evidence presented by the electricity 
company.18 Thus it was only those to whom the practice was applied that were relevant in 
assessing the ‘particular disadvantage’ against others for the purposes of proving indirect 
discrimination. So when everyone suffered equally and exactly in the same way on the basis 
of an apparently neutral criterion or practice which was in fact based on reasons of racial or 
ethnic origin, the case should have been better classified as direct rather than indirect 
                                                 
18  CHEZ RB (n 1) [36] [128]. 
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discrimination. In any case, the particular disadvantage condition should not have been 
deemed satisfied because neither did the practice apply to other districts in Dupnitsa nor could 
the nature of disadvantage between Roma and non-Roma in Gizdova mahala be seen as 
distinct or disproportionate.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the ECJ allowed indirect discrimination to be claimed by 
someone like Ms Nikolova who did not herself possess the relevant personal characteristic (of 
being Roma) which formed the basis of the claim.19 Here the ECJ fortifies a long trend of 
decisions which extend the right to claim not just direct but also indirect discrimination on the 
basis of other’s personal characteristic.20 The ECJ has previously allowed parents of children 
to claim indirect discrimination on the basis of their children’s nationality or disability in 
Palermo-Toia21 and Schmid22 respectively. In CHEZ RB, the ECJ extends the personal scope 
of claiming indirect discrimination to those who are not only directly related to those who 
possesses the relevant characteristics (as in the previous cases) but also to those like Ms 
Nikolova who suffer collateral disadvantage along with Roma residents in Gizdova mahala. 
In this respect, Article 2(2)(b) lies in stark contrast with other indirect discrimination 
provisions, for example Article 19(1) of the UK Equality Act 2010 which defines indirect 
discrimination as: ‘A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a 
provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected 
characteristic of B’s.’ No such limitation of a claimant herself possessing the relevant 
protected characteristic exists in Article 2(2)(b).  
 
                                                 
19  ibid [54] [60]. 
20  Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV [2008] ECR I–
5187; Asociatia ACCEPT v Consiliul National pentru Combaterea Discrimination [2013] EUECJ C-
81/12; Coleman (n 3). 
21  [1979] ECR 2645. 
22  [1993] ECR I-3011.  
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But it is worth considering how far the symmetry in result allows anyone (to whom an 
impugned measure applies) to claim indirect discrimination. It may be useful to stress that 
although CHEZ RB generously extends the personal scope of claiming indirect discrimination 
beyond the previous jurisprudence which was limited to persons directly related to those with 
the relevant personal characteristic, it retains the requirement for showing particular 
disadvantage associated with a ground. This is because the impugned measure did not just 
apply to Ms Nikolova, it also disadvantaged her in exactly the same way as Roma in the 
district. Since the disadvantage suffered by Roma in turn was based on racial or ethnic origin, 
it seems but sensible to extend the scope of claiming indirect discrimination to a non-Roma 
like Ms Nikolova. This shared disadvantage is what makes CHEZ RB an apt case for 
extending the personal scope of indirect discrimination. And thus, one must be judicious in 
interpreting CHEZ RB as extending to cases which are not based on shared disadvantage. The 
example of intersectional discrimination – based not just on shared but also unique 
disadvantage suffered on more than one ground – illustrates this dilemma.23    
 
A uniform policy requiring all women in an airline crew to wear their hair straight may 
indirectly and disproportionately affect Black women who wear their hair natural or in braids 
or weaves.24 Allowing a white woman with braids to claim indirect discrimination based on 
gender because, although not a Black woman, she suffers from the same disadvantage of not 
                                                 
23  See for an explanation of the character of intersectional discrimination as based on both same and 
different patterns of disadvantage: Kimberlé W Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race 
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics’ (1989) UCLF 139; Sumi Cho, Kimberlé W Crenshaw and Leslie McCall, ‘Toward a Field of 
Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis’ (2013) 38 Signs 785. 
24  This example is loosely based on Rogers v American Airlines (1981) 527 F Supp 229, 232 (SDNY) 
where a Black woman’s claim of indirect discrimination against American Airlines’ neutral policy of 
banning braided hairstyles was dismissed. Interestingly, the Court used the evidence of a popular white 
actor Bo Derek wearing braids to dismiss any racial significance of braids, thereby also undercutting the 
differences between the choice of hair for white women and black women based on gender. See also 
similar claims in Pitts v Wild Adventures, Inc. (2008) Civil Action No. 7:06-CV-62-HL (Middle District 
of Georgia Valdosta Division); Hollins v Atlantic Company, Inc. (1999) 188 F3d 652 (6th Cir); Cooper 
v American Airlines (1998) 149 F3d 1167 (4th Cir); McBride v Lawstaf, Inc. (1996) Civil Action No. 
1:96-cv-0196-cc (US District Court in Atlanta); Jenkins v Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance Inc. 
(1994) 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir). 
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being able to wear her hair as she pleases, seems to invert the protection afforded by indirect 
discrimination. This protection was specifically meant to address insidious forms of 
disadvantage experienced by those who have historically, persistently and substantially 
suffered on the basis of their race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability and age. A 
white woman’s choice to wear her hair in braids may not qualify because it has not been a 
choice that has been stereotyped and demeaned as unnatural or ugly, 25  or seen as 
undignified,26 or been at the heart of prejudice against those seeking employment in the 
service sector, limiting their substantive freedoms27 and autonomy,28 or denying them social 
inclusion and integration.29 Allowing a white woman to claim on the basis of Black women’s 
hair incorrectly assumes that Black and white women have the same reasons for wearing 
braids or weaves.30 In fact, the reasons for white women’s versus Black women’s hair choices 
remain highly distinguishable in that only Black women’s identities have been impinged on 
the hair type which is considered undesirable and ugly.31 Thus, though the white employee 
does suffer the disadvantage of not being able to wear her hair as she pleases, that 
disadvantage is not one which is similar to Black women’s disadvantage based on race or 
gender.32 Focussing on the white woman’s claim of gender discrimination may detract from 
recognising Black women’s intersectional disadvantage based on both race and gender, i.e. 
the unique historical disadvantage and specific cultural identity of Black women as Black 
                                                 
25  Deborah Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong? (HUP 2008).  
26  Denise Réaume, ‘Discrimination and Dignity’ (2003) 63 LLR 1.  
27  Sophia Moreau, ‘What is Discrimination’ (2010) 38 PPA 143.  
28  Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom  (OUP 1999). 
29  Hugh Collins, ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’ (2003) 66 MLR 16.  
30  Deleso Alford Washington, ‘The Anatomy of a “Pantsuit”: Performance, Proxy, and Presence for 
Women of Color in Legal Education’ (2009) 30 Journal of Public Law and Policy 605, 620-21.  
31  Angela Onwuachi-Willig, ‘Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII’ 
(2010) 98 Georgetown Law Journal 1079, 1082, 1093-94. 
32  Michelle L Turner, ‘The Braided Uproar: A Defense of My Sister’s Hair and a Contemporary 
Indictment of Rogers v. American Airlines’ (2011) 7 Cardozo Women’s Law Journal 115, 132 (‘White 
women do not attach the same cultural meaning to braided hairstyles that Black women attach’). So 
even if white women do end up benefiting if the policy is revoked, their claim of indirect discrimination 
would be one based on a mere preference or inconvenience which although may be the domain of 
another right like freedom of expression, does not seem to speak to ‘discrimination’ as disadvantage 
associated with grounds or personal characteristics. 
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women.33 As the example of Rogers v American Airlines shows, when a Court looks at white 
women’s experiences of wearing braids or cornrows to adjudicate on the legitimacy of a 
neutral airline policy of no braids, the claim not only fails for its lack of connection with race 
but also ends up subordinating Black women’s position to that of white women.34 It serves as 
a relevant cautionary tale in interpreting CHEZ RB’s generous ruling on who can claim 
indirect discrimination more cautiously. It holds especially true for cases of intersectional 
discrimination, say by Roma women, where the danger of people claiming along with or on 
behalf of intersectional claimants may end up masking the nature of such discrimination as 
based on more than one ground of discrimination.  
 
Implications 
 
While the ECJ’s trenchant account of direct discrimination allows us to appreciate Ms 
Nikolova’s claim, its simplistic treatment of indirect discrimination fails to convince as a 
matter of text or logic of discrimination law. The result being that the ECJ was doubly 
generous towards Ms Nikolova’s claim but only half as logical. Its analysis under Article 
2(2)(b) shows the inconvenient interpretation it followed down the path of indirect 
discrimination just to reach a favourable finding; especially when a less cumbersome route of 
                                                 
33  See for a comprehensive discussion the seminal pieces Paulette M Caldwell, ‘A Hair Piece: 
Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender’ (1991) 1991 Duke Law Journal 365 and D Wendy 
Greene, ‘Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair ... in the Workplace’ (2011) 14 Journal of Gender, 
Race & Justice 405. This does not undercut the fact that white women and Black men too suffer from 
dominant cultures and stereotypes; the purpose is only to emphasise how a different claimant (white 
women or Black men) can obscure intersectional disadvantage of claimants like Black women. Turner, 
ibid 133 (‘As between Black and White women, a policy that prohibited braids had an effect on Black 
women that was substantially different from the policy's effect on White women. While American 
Airlines' policy did apply to both Black and White women, only Black women lost the ability to wear a 
hairstyle that was unique to their culture.’). 
34  Although Rogers was not claimed by a white plaintiff, the Court used the isolated instance of a white 
actor, Bo Derrek, wearing cornrows to determine the legitimacy of Black women’s complaint of 
indirect discrimination due to the airline hair policy. Ayana Byrd and Lori Tharps mention one such 
unique case by a white woman which unsuccessfully claimed discrimination based on her braided hair. 
Ayana Byrd and Lori Tharps, Hair Story Untangling the Roots of Black Hair in America (Griffin 2002) 
324; Greene, ibid 348; Caldwell, ibid 379-380. 
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direct discrimination had already accomplished this. A straightforward approach would have 
been to acknowledge that in cases like CHEZ RB, when everyone, Roma and non-Roma like 
Ms Nikolova are equally disadvantaged in exactly the same way (lack of ability to read 
electricity meters, stereotyped as criminals) because of a practice based on racial or ethnic 
origin, the claim may be better classified as one of direct rather than indirect discrimination.  
 
For the UK discrimination law consolidated in the Equality Act 2010, the most significant 
implication of CHEZ RB is in regards who can claim indirect discrimination. The wording of 
Section 19(1) makes clear that indirect discrimination is personal in nature such that the 
victim of indirect discrimination must herself possess the necessary personal characteristic. In 
order to comply with EU law (so far as it continues to apply until the Brexit vote is enforced), 
UK domestic law under Section 19 will have to be significantly broadened, either judicially or 
legislatively, to include those suffering alongside those possessing the relevant personal 
characteristic. While CHEZ RB specifically concerned the protected ground of race in the 
context of provision of a public service, there is no reason why the logic cannot be extended 
to other Directives (viz. Gender Directive and the Equal Treatment Framework) and protected 
grounds covered within the Equality Act 2010, viz. age, disability, gender reassignment, 
marriage and civil partnership, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation, as well as 
to other contexts like employment and social security. Thus, in widening the net of who can 
bring claims of indirect discrimination, this ruling inflates the potential claims which can be 
brought under domestic discrimination laws like the UK. Non-Muslims who are affected by 
their employer’s policy of compulsory work on Fridays and men who cannot take benefit of a 
crèche available only for children of full-time employees, may now be equally entitled to 
bring claims of indirect religious and sex discrimination respectively. While these claims 
could previously only be conceived in relation to Muslims or women under the UK law, 
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CHEZ RB opens up the possibility to claim indirect discrimination for those who share the 
disadvantage alongside Muslims and women. Future litigation at the domestic and EU level 
will reveal the extent to which collateral claimants and their lawyers will exploit these vast 
possibilities.   
 
CHEZ RB also has some useful lessons for discrimination lawyers, especially in the UK. In 
relation to direct discrimination, it provides a cue for reimagining the jurisprudence following 
James v Eastleigh Borough Council35 where the irrelevance of a perpetrator’s motive has 
devolved into the irrelevance of reasons for less favourable treatment. The ECJ’s balancing 
act of excluding the electricity company’s motivation for adopting the policy (whether 
malicious intent towards Roma or preventing electricity theft), while recognising the reason 
for it as based on the racial or ethnic membership of the district avoids the paradoxical results 
reached by the UK courts in following ‘but for’ or ‘inherently’ discriminatory tests for direct 
discrimination.36 The reasoning in CHEZ RB shows how each of the elements in the equation 
of direct discrimination (intention, distinction, ground, impact, and justification) needs to be 
delineated for a simpler and structured analysis of direct discrimination.  
 
At the same time, CHEZ RB’s interpretation of the phrase ‘apparently neutral’ in Article 
2(2)(b) can have an inadvertent constructive effect on UK discrimination law such that cases 
like James could be reclassified as indirect discrimination and could hence succeed. James 
involved a challenge to the use of pensionable age (65 years for men; 60 years for women) as 
a criterion for allowing free entry to a community swimming pool. The Court applied the ‘but 
for’ test (‘would the complainant [a man over 60] have received the same treatment from the 
                                                 
35  [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL). 
36  See R v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15; Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police v Khan 
[2001] 1 WLR 1947 (HL); Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [2000] 1 AC 502 (HL); R v 
Birmingham City Council, ex p Equal Opportunities Commission [1989] AC 1155 (HL). 
  17 
defendant but for his or her sex’ 37 ) and found that the measure constituted direct 
discrimination on grounds of sex under Section 29 of the UK Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
The Court disregarded the ‘intention or motive’ of the defendant for providing retirement 
benefits to people out of work and with less income.38 Per CHEZ RB, if James is treated as a 
case of indirect discrimination based on an ‘apparently neutral’ criterion of pensionable age 
rather than considering the criterion ‘inherently’ sex-based,39 the ‘intention or motive’ of the 
defendant could be reconsidered as a justification for adopting the criterion and perhaps find it 
lawful.  
 
But it is interesting to note that while the EU law in CHEZ RB pulls in the direction of finding 
for both direct and indirect discrimination (albeit in the alternative); the UK law pulls in the 
opposite direction with its long held view, reiterated by Lady Hale in JFS that: ‘Direct and 
indirect discrimination are mutually exclusive. You cannot have both at once.’40 So whilst 
CHEZ RB’s duplicative effort of finding for both direct and indirect discrimination may seem 
too unwieldy, it perhaps signals towards the need for both the EU law and jurisdictions like 
the UK to find a middle ground rooted in the actual and distinct definitions of direct and 
indirect discrimination to avoid rigmaroles like in CHEZ RB and slippages like in James.41  
One possibility is be to simply converge the classical distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination by adopting a common definition of discrimination as adopted by the Canadian 
                                                 
37  James (n 43) 774. 
38  ibid 758.  
39  ibid 769.  
40  JFS (n 44) [57]. 
41  In fact, in addition to slippages in direct discrimination, the current trend in the UK of requiring 
plaintiffs to show ‘the reason why’ a neutral provision, criterion or practice is indirectly discriminatory 
is a step backwards in almost obliterating the category of indirect discrimination which has to do with 
impact rather than reasons for discrimination. See Essop and others v Home Office (UK Border Agency) 
[2015] EWCA 609; Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] EWCA 1264. See the critique of this 
trend in Sandra Fredman, ‘The Reason Why: Unravelling Indirect Discrimination’ (2016) 45 Industrial 
Law Journal 231.  
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Supreme Court 42  or at least a test for adjudication which focuses mainly on impact on 
disadvantaged groups like the South African Constitutional Court.43 Whilst the analysis of 
direct discrimination embedded in both the discriminator’s reasoning as well as the impact on 
disadvantaged groups seems to suggest this, the analysis of indirect discrimination is too thin 
to support this move. Another possibility, as Fredman argues, would be to simply insist on 
direct discrimination as based on discriminatory reasons for action and indirect discrimination 
to do with discriminatory effects, such that the ‘key issue [in indirect discrimination] is 
whether the practice can be justified in the light of possible alternatives, and if not, how it 
should be modified or replaced.’44 This may fare better than finding for both direct and 
indirect discrimination like CHEZ RB in EU law or misclassifying one as the other, as 
common in the UK law. In fact, given the distinct definitions of direct and indirect 
discrimination in EU law, in the final analysis, it may be helpful to view CHEZ RB as 
maintaining this distinction at least in its scrupulous maneuvering of direct discrimination and 
finding indirect discrimination, only in the alternative, even if excessively.  
 
                                                 
42  British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v BCGEU (1990) Carswell BC 
1907 (SCC).  
43  Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC); Catherine Albertyn and Beth Goldbaltt, ‘Equality’ in Staurt 
Woolman, Theunis Roux and Michael Bishop (eds), Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd edn, 
JUTA 2009) 35-46.   
44  Fredman (n 49) 243.  
